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WOE UNTO YOU LAWYERS: A REVIEW*
Max Radin t
HE blurb on the cover twice calls this book a "lusty, gusty attack
on The Law." No writer can be held responsible for the blurbs
with which his book is commended to the public by those whose business
it is to sell it. But many who read it-there will undoubtedly be many
-will do so in the hope that it is precisely what the cover describes,
since lusty, gusty attacks on anything make juicy reading and law and
lawyers have been fair game almost ever since either word became a
term of common speech. Professor Rodell's title is taken from the
Gospels and many of his chapters are introduced by apt quotations
which ridicule or abuse The Law. I hope that in the third and subsequent editions he will add the passage from Gulliver which is the bitterest and most devastating of all attacks on lawyers; and also perhaps,
some sentences from Mr. A. P. Herbert, who has recently and wittily
uncovered our nakedness.
Since it is so old and immemorially recognized an evil which he
attacks, it might be interesting to see at once what he proposes to do
about it. The remedy is absurdly simple. He would abolish The Law,
or rather our system of law,-or perhaps I should say, The-Law-as-aSystem,---and make the practice of law a crime (p. 272). Whether
he would kill the lawyers as Jack Cade proposed to do, and did to some
extent, I am not sure; but he is aware that there is some danger that
the uprooting of the existing system of law and lawyers would
merely clear the fields for a new crop of noxious weeds indistinguishable from their predecessors. This will not happen, he assures
us, if the "new system were entrusted-as it would be entrusted-to
men trained and skilled in coping with practical human problems."
Alas, even these trained and skilled men-whom I should have more
difficulty in discovering than Professor Rodell has--are only too likely,
once they are entrusted with a system, to do the very thing with it
that Professor Rodell is sure only "lawyers or men skilled principally
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in abstract logic" would do, that is, develop new "principles" and a
"spedal language." If a future Plato defined man, he would not call
him a featherless biped with broad flat nails, but the kind of animal
which, if entrusted with a system, will dress up that system in a more
or less elaborate vestment of principles.
So far as Professor Rodell uses the warrant of the secular attacks
on law and lawyers, he seems to have the wrong sow by the ear or
rather, the sow by the wrong ear, which may well be in this instance
the animal's tail. The burden of the popular litany of commination of
which lawyers have so long been the object is not that they have been
too much concerned with general piinciples but that they have been
too little so concerned. Again and again, the cry has gone forth that if
some few ground principles were announced and adhered to, they
would solve all the problems of the law.
Indeed, so far as the practice of the law is concerned, Professor
Rodell's onslaught is especially misdirected. He regards lawyers in
their capacity as advisers of the public with particular aversion; but
when lawyers advise their clients they are singularly free from any
indulgence in abstractions or pedantic generalities. That eminent barrister, Mr. Dove, in the difficult matter of the Eustace diamonds,
explained in perfectly rational and common sense terms why a pot or
pan could be an heirloom but not a diamond necklace valued at ten
thousand pounds. I mean to express no opinion as to the soundness of
Mr. Dove's law, but merely to suggest that there is nothing ethereal
or grandiloquent in the advice lawyers give their clients on how the
clients should avoid personal or business difficulties and to what extent
they can get out of their difficulties when-relying frequently on lofty
generalities they have picked up from distinctly non-legal sourcesthey have-made a mess of things.
It is mainly when lawyers discuss these questions among themselves
or write about them for purposes of records which practically no one
reads but themselves, that they use their own special and technical
language which Professor Rodell berates so much throughout the book.
He might just as well be annoyed at the fact that Frenchmen talk to
each other in French and not in the proper and suitable language of all
humankind, which is, of course, Basic English. The moment men get
specialized for any function they will use technical terms which are for
the most part shorthand expressions. It really is easier to say "habeas
corpus" and "foreclosure" than to describe in detail all that is contained
in these terms. As a matter of fact, there is a technical language of
iconoclasts as Professor Rodell can easily verify if he consults the many
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books that have before him proved the futility and imbecility of The
Law.
Professor Rodell gives us what he takes to be specific illustrations
of how the evil communications of legal abstractions corrupt the good
manners of everyday life. He falls viciously upon the doctrine of "consideration" which as a doctrine is an undoubted mystery to laymen.
He says (pp. 48-49):
"If a man says to a panhandler, '1 like your face, so tomorrow
I'm going'to give you a dollar' there is no Consideration for the
promise, and so there is no Contract, since The Law does not take
such esthetic values into account. But if a man says to a panhandler
'If you'll give me that cigarette in your hand, I'll give you a hundred dollars tomorrow,' and the bum hands over the cigarette, then
there is Consideration for the promise and there may well be a
valid Contract."
The difficulty with his illustration is that it is a pure abstraction.
And that is too bad, since the books are full of illustrations which seem
to have really occurred and which would have helped our understanding much more. The handsome panhandler would not be heard in court
if he sued for his money, and I suspect most of Professor Rodell's
readers would hardly think he should be. But it is almost certain that
the panhandler with the cigarette would be equally rejected, because it
is highly unlikely that any court would take the promise to have been
made seriously.
For, when Professor Rodell goes on to say: "The Law of Contracts
rarely pays attention to surrounding circumstances," one lifts the eyebrows, to speak with Mr. Wodehouse. Surely Professor Rodell cannot
have recently read the record in any contract litigation in which consideration was in issue. What actually is examined is quite unlike his
racy account of the Strange Adventure of the Bum and the Butt, but
much more like the way in which men in actual business affairs (even
without the intervention of lawyers) deal with situations in which one
side asserts an obligation and the other side denies it.
I wonder whether Professor Roden supposes that when he has got
his common sense copers with practical human problems, instead of the
existing group of abstractionizing mountebanks, in charge of the law,
he will have the exact science he desiderates. I am afraid it will not be
particularly exact even then. In that future golden age, any trained
statistician will, .of. course, give him mathematical formulas for the
regulation of conduct, which will contain their due quota of signs of
integration and determinants, buit if they are honest formulas, their
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margins of error will be so extensive as to leave only a little solid fringe
of -precision at the edges. And, as a matter of fact, precisely similar
formulas could be constructed now, since to do the existing profession
of law justice-I hope Professor Rodell will excuse the use of the most
vicious of the abstractions of The Law-only a very limited number
of lawyers have ever thought of their science as an exact one.
All this is not to say that many of Professor Rodell's blows do not
hit vulnerable spots. The trouble is they are not only vulnerable but
so sore from frequent belaboring that it seems hardly worthwhile hacking at them in a whole book. But lawyers will be ill-advised if they let
themselves forget how full of chinks their armor is merely because
Professor Rodell has frequently struck the air or smashed to bits empty
carapaces. The Law deserves much of what is here said about it. It is quite
true that many lawyers still refuse to understand that the process of rationalization is as inevitable in The Law as in all thinking. And it is
wholly true that pedanty and pomposity mark printed legal discourse
to an absurd extent. And, again, it is eminently true that if The Law
looked squarely at what it was doing instead of obliquely it might reach
its goal more expeditiously.
But it is not likely that improvement will be effected by the lurid
set-pieces-of fiery curses that Professor Rodell has touched off. He
charges lawyers with being the modern counterpart of primitive medicine men, but his own book has an extraordinary resemblance to what
we might suppose primitive warlocks do when they construct images
of their enemies and symbolically stab and slash the images while
mumbling curses over them. The curse is ineffective unless the image
can be identified with the person sought to be eliminated. Professor
Rodell's image of a lawyer only slightly resembles one. Curses according to primitive belief, unless the ritual of cursing is carefully performed, might slide right over the persons cursed. Some of Professor
Rodell's curses seem certainly to have done so.

